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Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups*

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Why do some ethnic groups in conflict (those that are mobilized or face discrimination) receive more external support than others do? This is an important question that has been overlooked despite the crucial role international support has played. Which characteristics of groups and their host states cause them to receive more support? I consider three explanations. First, separatist groups are less likely to receive support owing to their threat to regional stability and international norms. This argument is derived from accounts focusing on the inhibiting impact of vulnerability upon the foreign policies of African states. Second, groups in stronger states are more likely to receive support as states try to weaken their most threatening adversaries – an application of realist logic. Third, groups with ethnic ties to actors in positions of power elsewhere are more likely to receive external assistance. Using Minorities at Risk data, analyses focusing on the number of states supporting particular groups and the intensity of this support suggest that ethnic ties influence the international relations of ethnic conflict more than vulnerability and relative power. Further analyses contrast the international relations of peaceful ethnic disputes and violent ethnic conflicts. These analyses reveal that some factors (such as regime type, nearby separatism) increase breadth and/or intensity of support for groups that are not engaged in violence, while other variables (separatism of the group in question, relative power of host) influence the international relations of violent conflicts. The article concludes with implications for policy and future research.

Introduction

Why did outside actors give significant help to Kosovo's Albanians but not to other ethnic groups? What causes some groups to receive significant international assistance while others are ignored? Comparing African conflicts to Bosnia and Kosovo, politicians, journalists, and analysts frequently criticize the discriminating nature of international intervention. Yet, little systematic work has addressed why some ethnic groups get more help in their battles against their host states even though the level of external assistance influences whether ethnic groups, particularly separatist groups, are successful.

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Three sorts of answers have been posed: (1) separatist groups will not receive support since they challenge the ability of states to maintain their borders; (2) the relative power of the host state influences whether a group gets outside help; and (3) groups with ethnic ties to actors elsewhere will get more support.[1] The first argument represents the conventional wisdom in this issue area – separatism is a threat to international boundaries, so states are unlikely to support secessionists (Herbst, 1989; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). We can deduce the second perspective from the logic of realism. If states balance power, then states will not only form alliances to challenge the stronger powers, they will also support groups within the more powerful countries to weaken their potential adversaries.[2] Domestic politics drives the third argument, as politicians seeking support at home will favor groups in other states that have ethnic ties with their constituents (Saideman, 1997, 2001a).

In this article, I use the Minorities at Risk dataset (Gurr, 1993, 2000) to test hypotheses derived from these arguments.[3] Before proceeding with the analyses, I suggest why this question is an important one. I then discuss the logic of the competing arguments and specify the quantitative analyses. Finally, I draw out the implications of the analyses.

Why Discrimination Matters

There are at least three good reasons for studying this question: the relative scarcity of systematic analyses of the topic, the fact that international support is crucial to a group's success, and that outside support, by definition, internationalizes a conflict, significantly complicating the dispute.

First, scholars have considered whether ethnic conflicts produce more violence than other kinds of conflict (Carment, 1993), and whether the presence of discriminated minorities influences the kinds of international conflict states have (Davis & Moore, 1997). Unfortunately, few studies have considered why some groups receive more support. Elsewhere, I argue (Saideman, 1997) that ethnic politics influences which states support which groups. However, the study has limited generalizability due to: the selection of only secessionist cases (as opposed to all ethnic groups), the three cases I studied may not be representative of all secessionist conflicts, and the omission of realist approaches.[4] Regan (1998) examined the conditions under which states intervene in civil conflicts, but his effort to test the importance of ethnic affinities focused solely on how many states did the host state border.[5] While Huntington's (1993) arguments have raised the issue of how identities may influence world politics quite prominently in the media, in policymaking circles, and elsewhere, he does not rigorously test his claims.

Second, international support may determine who wins. Horowitz (1985: 230) has argued: 'Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined

[1] There are other potential explanations, including those focusing on the economic resources of the seceding territory (Gibbs, 1991), but owing to limitations of both space and available data, this article focuses only on these three.

[2] See Heraclides (1991) for the applied argument; for the more general argument, see Walt (1987) and Waltz (1979).

[3] The Minorities at Risk dataset focuses on groups that are 'at risk,' meaning that they are politically mobilized or have faced discrimination, including disadvantaged majorities and advantaged minorities (but not to advantaged majorities). In the text below, when I refer to ethnic groups, the generalizations only apply to ethnic groups at risk, and not to all ethnic groups. This study, to be clear, is only on the international relations of ethnic groups in conflict, with conflict defined quite broadly.

[4] Carment & James (1997) argue that intervention in ethnic conflicts is shaped by domestic and international factors, and follows similar lines of argument to what is presented here, but they test their argument qualitatively.

[5] While the number of contiguous states does say something about the opportunity to intervene in a civil conflict, this variable carries other implications besides ethnic ties.

largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces beyond the state.' For instance, Indian support was decisive in the secession of the Bengalis from Pakistan. All groups, regardless of their goals, are better situated to bargain or to fight if they have external allies (Heraclides, 1990). Money, arms, sanctuaries, and direct military intervention all improve a group's chances of reaching its goals.

Third, when a group receives foreign assistance, the conflict is internationalized. Some have argued that internationalization makes the conflict harder to solve (Zartman, 1992). Others have argued that external support may increase the conflict's violence as the group becomes better armed and more confident (Carment, 1993; Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997).[6] Internationalization of a conflict draws in international organizations, severely taxing their resources and perhaps the institution more directly. The Congo crisis threatened the United Nations quite severely as African countries and the Soviet Union questioned its commitment to the defense of the Congo. Many African countries withdrew their troops from the UN force, while the Soviet Union sought radical reform of the institution. Likewise, the Yugoslav conflict challenged the UN, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as members within each organization disagreed about which groups to support.

Because we lack a good understanding of the international relations of ethnic conflict, it is hard to make effective policy. Through the international relations of ethnic conflict across the universe of ethnic groups at risk, we can get at some of the dynamics at work and why some conflicts gain more attention.

[6] This paragraph draws, in part, from Deepa Khosla's research (forthcoming), which focuses on the consequences of international intervention, while this article focuses on the sources of intervention.

Competing Explanations: Vulnerability, Power, and Ethnic Ties

While there are many ways of explaining why some groups gain more support, three approaches seem to be the most likely candidates: neoliberal institutional approaches focusing on the group's goals; realist approaches focusing on relative power; and domestic political approaches focusing on the ethnic identities of groups.[7]

Vulnerability

Analysts have argued that states vulnerable to ethnic conflict and separatism tend not to support separatist movements. The vulnerability argument attempts to understand the extraordinary stability of African boundaries, despite the weakness of African states. Scholars of Africa's international relations argue that vulnerability to separatism inhibited leaders from supporting similar groups in other African states. This threat also caused them to create the Organization of African Unity to help maintain Africa's boundaries (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; Touval, 1972).[8] While not all vulnerability theorists explicitly rely on neoliberal instititutionalism as their theoretical foundation,[9] Herbst (1989) clearly relies on Keohane's (1986) work. Herbst stresses both specific reciprocity and the problem of overcoming transaction costs as he explains why African states have built international organizations and norms to restrain states from supporting separatism and to maintain the integrity of African states.

[7] Because of space limitations, I do not address the possibility that states may be acting altruistically. Perhaps states support the most 'deserving' groups – those who face greater threats or those who can most ably make the case that they are worthy. In the analyses below, focusing on the role of violence may get at this indirectly.

[8] For a critique of this argument, see Surhke & Noble (1977).

[9] Most vulnerability theorists are in line with the main tenets of neoliberal institutionalism as they emphasize the importance of international norms and organizations for facilitating the realization of a common interest.

While the argument has generally predicted that vulnerable states are less likely to support separatism, a logical implication is that separatist groups are less likely to receive international support than other kinds of ethnic groups.[10] Ethnic groups with such aims are greater threats to other states and to international norms governing boundaries because they seek to revise existing boundaries. Ethnic groups with other kinds of aspirations generally threaten only their host.[11] Groups seeking more rights within their political system and those competing for control of the government pose less of a threat to international norms and to the political stability of other countries. Further, the vulnerability argument focuses on the development of a norm of territorial integrity, which applies quite clearly to secession but does not have obvious implications for other kinds of ethnic conflict (Herbst, 1989; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).

H1: Separatist groups are less likely to receive broad support and less likely to receive intense assistance than other kinds of groups.[12]

A second implication of vulnerability is that states may be deterred from support groups residing in highly vulnerable states. If states are concerned about the consequences of supporting an ethnic group, then they should be most concerned about supporting ethnic groups in states already characterized by a high degree of separatist activity. Supporting such a group is more likely to lead to the disintegration of the state, perhaps endangering regional stability.

H2: Groups in highly vulnerable states are less likely to receive any help or intense support.

Third, states may be inhibited from supporting an ethnic group if it resides in a particularly troubled area. If a group resides in a country where the neighboring states are confronting separatist groups, then the danger of conflict spilling over and endangering regional security is significant. The heart of the vulnerability argument is that regional security concerns caused African states to support a prohibition against supporting secession (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Therefore, states should be least likely to support groups where the danger of spillover is most severe – where there are other separatist groups.

H3: A group near other states facing separatism is less likely to receive broad or intense support.

Fourth, we should consider whether sub-Saharan African ethnic groups are less likely to receive external assistance. Because analysts conceived the vulnerability argument with sub-Saharan Africa in mind,[13] we should test whether groups in this region are treated differently than groups elsewhere. Vulnerability theorists would expect groups in sub-Saharan Africa to receive less support owing to the norm of territorial integrity that the Organization of African Unity established in 1964 and has reinforced through its behavior in past secessionist conflicts

[10] Previous studies support this expectation as they have found that separatist groups are less likely to receive support (Heraclides, 1991).

[11] This discussion divides ethnic groups between separatists and non-separatists. Obviously, ethnic groups have a variety of aims, and can be distinguished from each other along other lines, such as ideology. Future work should examine the ideological appeals of ethnic groups to determine their impact on international support.

[12] As will become clear below, the analyses will focus on two questions: how many countries support a particular group? What was the highest intensity of support given to a group?

[13] States in northern Africa are considered to be less vulnerable to separatism. Although they are members of the OAU, a fairer test of the vulnerability argument would focus on those states for which the conventional wisdom is supposed to apply. Tests with a variable for all African states produce similar results.

(Herbst, 1989; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). There may be an additional reason why groups in Africa receive less support, as some analysts (Moeller, 1999) have posited racism as being a likely cause of discrimination against groups in Africa. Perhaps states are less likely to intervene in Africa because they see Africans as being less important. Of course, the problem with this is that it would not account for African countries not giving assistance to other African countries, as we find below.

H4: Ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to receive any support.

Power[14]

Realists assume that the international relations of ethnic conflict are similar to those of other issue areas.[15] Heraclides (1991: 207) argues that security concerns motivate most supporters of secessionists, that the most important factors driving decisions to assist one side are: 'the existing constellation of states for and against the secessionists, strategic gains, the positions of allies, great and middle powers and friends, and relations with the state (government) threatened by secession.' Therefore, relative power and security concerns should cause some groups to gain more support and others less. However, making determinant predictions from the starting point of anarchy and the quest for security is difficult, as states may have more than one strategy for maximizing security – that realism is indeterminate.[16] To make more determinate predictions, I extend a realist theory that attempts to predict foreign policy. If states ordinarily balance power by allying with weaker states and by mobilizing their resources (Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979), then it makes sense that weakening the strong states would also improve one's security (Hager & Lake, 2000). If an adversary has to fight or contain ethnic groups within its boundaries, then it will have fewer resources available to challenge other states. Further, if the supported ethnic group secedes, then the adversary loses territory, population, and perhaps even significant economic resources, lessening the adversary's relative power.

H5a: Groups in stronger states are more likely to receive broader and more intense support.

Of course, there is another side to power relations – the stronger prey upon the weak. Weak states are often the victims of aggression by stronger, more able, countries. Weakness may deter states from supporting ethnic groups in stronger states because of fears of retaliation, whereas stronger states do what they want (Ayoob, 1995; Buzan, 1983). Indeed, some realists, offensive realists, focus on the maximization of power, as opposed to security, and what this means for 'greedy' states.[17] Thus, according to this line of thought, we ought to expect stronger states to receive less support.

H5b: Groups in weaker states are more likely to receive broader and more intense support.

Ethnic Ties

The desire for power and position within states may be more important to decision-makers than the relative power of other states. While Regan (1998: 758) argues that

[14] Bercovitch & Schneider (2000) consider a question related to this project – who mediates – and find mostly that power matters.

[15] Indeed, several realists have changed their focus from conventional warfare to ethnic conflicts (Kaufman, 1996; Posen, 1993).

[16] Of course, Waltz (1979) argues that his theory is one of international politics. However, realists and everyone else expect power and security to matter and to provide at least baseline predictions of how states behave (Elman, 1996).

[17] Prominent examples include Mearsheimer (1994/95), Schweller (1996), and Labs (1997).

domestic politics causes politicians to pursue policies that are likely to be successful, the logic here is that of position-taking. Politicians will take positions preferred by their constituents, even if such policies are likely to fail. In this section, I develop the argument that if domestic politics shapes foreign policy, the ethnic ties of politically relevant individuals and groups are likely to influence policy.[18]

First, the ethnic politics approach assumes that politicians are rational and that they care about gaining and holding office. Even if they have other interests, holding office is generally the prerequisite for attaining their goals through politics (Mayhew, 1974). Second, each politician requires the support of others to gain and maintain political office – the supporters forming the politician's constituency. All leaders need some sort of support to govern; or else, anarchy or civil war reigns. Third, this approach assumes that ethnic identities influence the preferences of the folks whose support politicians need.[19] Ethnic groups are 'collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society' (Rothschild, 1981: 2). These ties include race, religion, and language.[20]

From these assumptions, we can deduce that the ethnic ties of potential and existing constituents to external actors influence their preferences. If ethnic identity influences individuals' preferences towards domestic policies, these same identities should influence preferences towards foreign policies. Ethnic identity, by its nature, creates feelings of loyalty, interest, and fears of extinction (Horowitz, 1985). Constituents will care most about those with whom they share ethnic ties. Because politically relevant supporters, by definition, are a crucial concern for policymakers, if ethnic ties determine the foreign policy preferences of constituents then such ties also influence the politician's foreign policy choices.[21] If the politician can influence foreign policy, the existence of ethnic ties and antagonisms between the politician's supporters and external actors will shape the state's foreign policy (Davis & Moore, 1997).

In testing these claims, we should focus our attention on those states in which the ethnic group's kin has power. If ethnic politics influences the foreign policy of countries, then when an ethnic group has kin ruling a neighboring state we should expect that state to help the ethnic group.[22] Because the kin dominates the state, we should expect the support to be intense.

H6: If a neighboring state is dominated by an ethnic group's kin, then that group is likely to receive support and particularly intense support.

Alternatively, we can focus on different identities – race, religion, and language – to

[18] For a more thorough discussion of the logic of ethnic politics and foreign policy, see Saideman (2001a).

[19] For rational choice views of why followers care about ethnic identities, see Hardin (1995) and de Figueiredo & Weingast (1999).

[20] There is a long-running debate about whether ethnic identity is a given in society (primordial) or created by politicians as they see fit. I follow the moderate position: multiple ethnic identities frequently co-exist and the political context determines the salience of particular identities.

[21] This discussion and the subsequent analyses assume that ethnic groups can influence politicians, ignoring the problems of lobbying and of collective action. Obviously, some ethnic groups will be more effective in influencing politicians. However, the nature of this study makes it quite difficult to test these claims. Focusing on which states give support, rather than which groups might receive it, might access this question better, as some states might be easier to influence. The case study work that inspired this article (Saideman, 1997, 2001a) examines these issues further.

[22] The qualifier of 'neighboring' is a function of the dataset. Phase 1 of the MAR dataset included a dummy variable for when a group neighbored a state where ethnic kin either ruled or were in the majority. I used this variable as a starting point for coding a similar variable to work with phase III of the dataset (this variable was coded once – it does not vary by year).

consider whether the ethnic identity of a group shapes the amount of international support a group gets. Identities vary in how widely they are shared. Religion is perhaps the most widely shared identity, since many religions have adherents around the world. Consequently, events in Jerusalem matter to Jews in the United States, Muslims in Indonesia, and Catholics in Latin America. Religious identities overlap international boundaries much more so than linguistic groups. If ethnic ties influence foreign policy, then we should expect groups that have ethnic ties to more people in more states to get support than groups that have ethnic ties to fewer people in fewer states.

To test this argument, we need to focus on what ethnically differentiates the group in question from the rest of society. Many identities may help to identify an ethnic group, but only the differences between itself and its adversaries (the host state, other ethnic groups in the host state) are going to mobilize potential supporters elsewhere. If a group is of the same religion as the rest of the state, then religious identity is unlikely to bring in outside actors in support of the group, as they will have ties to both sides of the conflict. Only if the group is of a different religion will the religious affinities attract outside assistance. Groups differentiated by a broader ethnic identity are more likely to appeal to the constituents of politicians in other states than groups identified by a narrower ethnic identity.

H7a: Groups differentiated from the state by religion or race are more likely to get support.[23]

H7b: Groups differentiated from the state by language are less likely to get support.

Identities may also vary in how intensely they are felt, but it is not clear *a priori* that individuals outside of the conflict might feel a particular kind of identity like language less intensely than religion. Therefore, the hypotheses make no predictions about whether particular kinds of identity will shape the intensity of external support.

Data Analysis

The unit of analysis is each ethnic group, since this study considers why groups vary in how much support they receive. Elsewhere, I study why states might support ethnic groups (Saideman, 2001a). I use data primarily from the Minorities at Risk Dataset, Phase III,[24] which has as its unit of analysis individual ethnic groups (as opposed to states, conflicts, crises, or dyads). The dataset includes only ethnic groups that are politically salient. Specifically, minorities 'at risk' are defined as those ethnic groups that as groups gain from or are hurt by systematic discriminatory treatment compared to other groups in the society; and/or groups that are the basis for political mobilization for the promotion of the group's interests.[25] The dataset is biased as it includes only groups that are 'at risk' –

[23] Such groups are also likely to face more opposition, as more states will have ties to the state they are fighting (Saideman & Dougherty, 2000). Owing to the dataset's limits, this study does not address the support that hosts receive.

[24] I use the most recent version, MARv899. This version reincorporates older data from Phase I, including many groups that were dropped for various reasons (redefintion of identities, changes in state boundaries, no longer at risk, changes in population size). To be clear, the analyses presented here are only for those groups coded as 'CURRENT' in the dataset. I dropped the non-active cases since the data for these were incomplete.

[25] The dataset contains information for 275 groups, and groups are included if they meet the additional criteria: only groups in countries with 1995 populations larger than 1,000,000; only groups with populations of larger than 100,000, or, if fewer, if the group exceeds 1% of at least one state's population; groups are counted separately if they reside in more than one country as they meet the more general population criteria; and if the group is not an advantaged majority (advantaged minorities and disadvantaged majorities are included) (Gurr, 2000).

ethnic groups that are not at risk are not included in the dataset. This is not problematic for this study because it is an effort to understand the international politics of ethnic conflicts. We cannot expect outsider actors to take sides in conflicts that do not exist. While work is continuing to address some of the flaws in the dataset, Minorities at Risk is currently the best dataset for considering the impact of group attributes on many questions, including what causes some groups to receive more support.

The Dependent Variables: Breadth and Intensity of Support

This study focuses on two dependent variables: the number of states supporting a particular group – breadth of support – and the highest level of support given to a group – intensity. Since the general question at hand considers why states discriminate in favor of or against particular ethnic groups, it makes sense to consider what kinds of groups are more popular (receive support from more states) and which groups receive more costly, more sincere, assistance (intensity of support). I derive these indicators from raw data provided by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management. The data list groups and the support these groups received from particular countries in the 1990s (biennally in the first half of the 1990s, yearly from 1996–98).[26] Of course, there is an inherent problem in coding support for ethnic groups, as much assistance is covert. The coding by the MAR project captures much, but probably not all, assistance ethnic groups receive.

I use two dependent variables to determine if the factors shaping the breadth of support also influence intensity of support.[27] The first dependent variable, breadth, is simply a count of the number of countries giving any support for a particular ethnic group.[28] The second dependent variable, intensity, is the highest level of support received by an ethnic group.

Table I. Levels of Support, Coded by Increasing Intensity

Value	*Label*	*Minorities at Risk labels*
0	None	No support received
1	Low	Ideological encouragement, diffuse support,* other unspecified support
2	Moderate	Non-military financial support, access to external communications, markets, transport, including the hosting of nonviolent exile organizations
3	Strong	Funds for military supplies, provision of military equipment and supplies, military training in exile, advisory military personnel, peacekeeping observers
4	Intense	Blockades, interdiction against regime, cross-border sanctuaries for armed fighters, rescue missions in country, cross-border raids in support of dissidents, active combat units in country.

* Diffuse support is a rather open category, referring to relatively weak forms of support.

[26] The MAR project used a variety of news sources to code international support, including local and international newspapers, magazines, journals, books, and Lexis/Nexus.

[27] The two variables are highly correlated, but only because the modal category for both is zero. Once one eliminates all of the groups receiving no support, the two dimensions are not significantly correlated.

[28] The data sheets only have four places to mark the countries giving support to a particular group and the level of support given, so with the exception of Bosnia (where six countries are squeezed in) the maximum number of supporters is four. This clearly leads to some under-counting, but only six groups have at least four supporters. Therefore, the actual effect of this coding problem should be quite small. Also, on several code-sheets, an international organization was included as a supporter of an ethnic group. I omitted these as it is hard to tell which countries supported the international organization's action, and because this project is in part about why countries do what they do, shaping the behavior of international institutions, rather than the reverse. This omission might undercount the level of support for a particular group. Further, in some cases, sub-state actors are listed as supporters. Since the focus of this study is why states discriminate, such actors were not counted.

Table I indicates the various forms of support countries might give to an ethnic group, and also how I coded intensity of support in order of increasing cost, risk, and efficacy. The MAR dataset has separate variables for intensity of political and military support, but I chose to use a different indicator for intensity of support. When countries choose to support an ethnic group, they do not make two separate decisions – one for military support and one for political support. Rather, the decision focuses on where along the continuum from no support to modest forms of political support to very serious forms of military intervention.[29] Because ideological encouragement, access to markets, and financial assistance are less expensive and less likely than provision of sanctuaries, raids, or direct military intervention in attracting the animus of the host state and in improving the group's chances for success, we need to consider under what conditions groups receive the most intense forms of support. This variable also separates insincere supporters from those who are more committed, since the more intense forms are riskier and costlier.

As an illustration of the coding, according the MAR data, in 1994–95, Armenia gave the Armenians of Azerbaijan military equipment and supplies, as well as access to external communications, markets, and transport, while Russia gave them funds for military supplies and advisory military personnel. This group receives a score of 2 for the number of countries giving support and a score of 3 for highest level of support (advisory military personnel). Some code-sheets lacked information about international support, so the total number of observations is 251.[30] To be clear, as I discuss the findings, some of my focus will simply be on the conditions that have to obtain if a group is to get any support from any state, as most groups get no help at all.

The Independent Variables

Table II presents the variables used to test each hypothesis, but a few require more explanation. To test the realist arguments, we need a measure of power. Correlates of War data proved helpful in developing an indicator for power (Singer & Small, 1995). Countries considered relatively powerful should have more military and economic resources than less powerful states. The size of a country's military, its military expenditures, and the country's population are important components of a country's military capability. Economic capabilities are important, as they provide resources that can be mobilized for military use as well as for coercion. An indicator of economic development and mobilization potential is iron and steel production. Using data on each country's military personnel, military

[29] One could also argue that the choice to give support to one group is limited by the amount of resources committed to support other ethnic groups. However, except for the most intensive forms of support, countries can be quite generous without exhausting themselves. Moreover, more than a few countries give assistance to more than one ethnic group (Saideman, 2001a), so, in practice, this is not as significant a constraint as one might think.

[30] The missing cases largely fall into two groups: Black minorities of Central and South America and groups in Iran. The other groups that do not have data for international support are Germany's Turks, Guinea's Susu, Sierra Leone's Temne, Zaire's Ngbandi, Egypt's Copts and Indonesia's Achenese. These omissions may cause some bias in the findings, but it is hard to determine whether such bias is systematic or significant. A rough attempt to code these missing cases produced results that did not vary much from those presented below. In the analyses, the total number of observations is 186 for the 1990–91 analyses, 201 for the 1994–95 analyses, and 227 for the 1998 analyses. The reduction in observations is due to missing information for some variables. As the descriptive statistics (in the Appendix) suggest, the culprits are largely regime type and language differentials. For regime type, countries in the midst of civil wars are not coded on a –10 to 10 scale (or 0 to 10 on autocracy and democracy scales). Thus, groups in countries like Bosnia and Somalia are dropped from the analyses in 1994–95. Dropping regime type from the analyses largely leaves the results intact, although relative power more significantly shapes intensity in the later 1990s, and the association between African states and less intense support in 1998 becomes insignificant. Also dropping language differentials increases the '*n*' of each analysis further (214 for 1990–91, 239 for 1994–95, 248 for 1998), and leaves results the same as dropping just regime type.

expenditure, production of iron and steel, and total population, each country was then ranked in each category in terms of the percentage of the country's capability relative to the world total.[31] I then averaged the country's percentages of each category world total. For instance, the United States in 1992 had 7.7% of world total military personnel, 39.5% of world military spending, 13.2% of the world's iron and steel production, and 4.7% of the world total population, resulting in an average power ranking of 16.3%.

The numbers result in a ranking similar to what common intuitions are of the great powers, middle powers, and the rest of the world.[32] Since the dataset's unit of analysis is ethnic group, the power score indicates the relative power of each ethnic group's host state in 1990 for the 1990–91 analyses and the relative power of the group's host in 1992 for the subsequent analyses.[33] While the indicators of relative power may not be perfect,[34] the criteria used for the rankings provide a good basis for assessing relative capabilities. If states tend to balance power, we would expect groups in host states with higher power rankings to get more support than groups in states with lower rankings.

The Minorities at Risk dataset contains indicators for intergroup differentials between the ethnic group and the majority or typical group. These variables range from 0, where no socially significant differentials exist, to 2, with substantial differentials. The dataset contains indicators for racial distinctions[35] and religious cleavages.[36] For linguistic differences, I use data from *Ethnologue* (Grimes & Grimes, 1996) that code groups by common supersets.[37] The data are coded from 1 to 20, with 20 reflecting groups whose language is considered identical to that of the comparison group. For the analyses here, we divide one by the language family score to put more weight on greater differentials.[38] All else being equal, we expect groups that are distinct due to race or religion to receive more support than groups distinguished by language.

Two control variables are also included in the analysis to deal with alternative explanations. First, given the importance of regime type in today's foreign policy debates, I include it to control for the impact of the

[31] This is a conventional method of developing an indicator for the relative power of states. I am grateful to Doug Van Belle for suggestions on how to construct this indicator. For a similar effort to code relative power, see Bremer (1992: 322). Because of missing data, particularly for energy use, the indicator here is not identical to Bremer's.

[32] The ranking has the top ten countries in order as: the USA, the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Republic of Korea. India is ranked higher than it probably should be because of its population size.

[33] There were simply too many missing data to construct an indicator for power for years after 1992. The dataset I used does not contain data beyond 1993, and the data for 1993 for energy consumption and urban population are generally missing.

[34] One could argue that this measure does not apply as well at the end of the 20th century, as the bases of power may have changed somewhat. I have used this composite indicator anyway for several reasons. First, it is the standard in the quantitative literature. Second, alternative conceptions of power would be difficult to operationalize (yet probably provide similar rankings), such as the sophistication of a country's military. Third, I use this variable to test realist notions about the impact of power on international relations, and most realists would argue that the capability to wage war (which this indicator is supposed to measure) has not changed as much as people would argue. Thus, using this variable is a fairer test of realist claims than using an alternative indicator. Finally, the measure seems to do a good job when one pairs up two countries and compares their relative power.

[35] Here and below are some illustrative examples of how groups were coded in the Dataset. A group not considered as racially distinct at all would be the Scots. A group that is physically distinguishable but of the same racial stock would be the Tamils in Sri Lanka. A group considered to be intermixed racially would be the Hutus and Tutsis. A group considered to be of a different racial stock would be the Europeans of South Africa.

[36] A group rated as having no religious differences would be the Europeans of South Africa. A group considered as a different sect but of the same religion would be Iraq's Shia. A group considered being of multiple sects not all sharing the same religion would be the Kurds of Iran. A groups considered to be of a different religion would be the Tibetans in China.

[37] I am grateful to James Fearon for providing me with these data and for advice in using them.

[38] A group with the least linguistic differences would be African-Americans, while groups with the most differences include the Indigenous peoples of Latin America.

Table II. Hypotheses and Related Indicators

	Hypothesis	*MAR indicator*
H1	Separatist groups are less likely to receive any international support than other kinds of groups, less likely to have many supporters, and less likely to receive intense support.	SEPX, recoded as a dichotomous variable to indicate whether a group is actively separatist or not.*
H2	Groups in highly vulnerable states are less likely to receive international support.	OTHSEPX, coded from SEPX: how many other groups in host state are actively separatist?
H3	When a host state neighbors states vulnerable to separatism, ethnic groups within the host state are less likely to receive any support.	NRSEPX, from SEPX: how many separatist groups exist in adjacent states?
H4	Ethnic groups in sub-Saharan Africa are less likely to any receive international support than groups elsewhere.	REGION variable, coded as dichotomous variable: is group in sub-Saharan Africa or not?
H5a	Groups in stronger states are more likely to get international support than groups in weaker states.	POWER90, POWER92: see below
H5b	Groups in weaker states are more likely to receive broader and more intense support.	POWER90, POWER92: see below
H6	If a neighboring state is dominated by an ethnic group's kin, then that group will receive support.	IDOMSEG, from Phase I and updated for 1990s – does group dominate or is majority in state adjacent to host state (see note 22).
H7a	Groups defined by religion or race are more likely to get support and support from more countries.	RACE, BELIEF: see text.
H7b	Groups defined by language are less likely to get support.	LANGFMI: see text
C1	Does the type of host state's government matter?	REGTYP90, REGTYP94, REGTYP98: using Polity98, subtracts Autocracy score (0–10) from Democracy score (0–10), coding host countries by level of political competitiveness from –10 to 10, with 10 being most democratic
C2	Does violence influence the behavior of outside actors?	REB89, REB93, REB97: Measures level of conflict between group and host state from none to protracted civil war.

* Actively separatist refers to whether a group is currently (in the 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to historically) engaged in an effort to gain separation or autonomy.

type of political system with which an ethnic group resides. Do ethnic groups within democracies get more or less support than ethnic groups in authoritarian systems? I created this indicator from Polity98 data by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score (Gurr & Jaggers, 1999).

Second, very violent conflicts may be more likely to attract external attention than very mild disputes because of greater media attention, greater refugee flows, and/or greater humanitarian concern. On the other hand, Regan (1998) argues that states intervene less in more violent conflicts because of the higher risks and lower probabilities of success, so including rebellion allows us to test one of his findings. The REB variables reflect the intensity of the conflict from none

to banditry to local rebellions to increasingly large-scale guerrilla warfare to protracted civil war. Since the dataset contains yearly values for rebellion in the 1990s, I use the value from the previous year. The logic here is that conflict attracts attention, so that states should react to past events. If we used rebellion scores from the same year as the dependent variable, it makes it harder to distinguish whether rebellion attracts external support or external support exacerbates ethnic conflict.[39]

Because both control variables played a much larger role than originally expected, additional analyses and discussion address how these variables interact with the others and what kinds of dynamics might be at work.

Analyses

I performed negative binomial regressions (controlling for clustering)[40] when analyzing the factors shaping the breadth of support groups received, since the dependent variable is essentially a counting of separate events.[41] Ordinary regression is inappropriate for the breadth data, as the data are non-negative, discrete, and highly skewed. Breadth ranges from zero, the modal category, to four, representing the number of countries supporting a particular group. Larger breadth scores are the result of more countries making relatively independent decisions about giving support to a particular group. Thus, counting the number of countries supporting a particular group is akin to counting discrete events. Poisson regression is often used in such cases, but since the variance of breadth in all periods studied exceeds its mean, negative binomial regression is the appropriate tool. Still, I should mention that the results of the breadth analyses below are largely consistent regardless of which statistical technique is applied – ordinary least squares regression, Poisson regression, ordered logit, ordered probit, or negative binomial regression.

For analyses of intensity of support, I performed ordered logit (again, controlling for clustering), since the intensity variable is ordinal–international support, coded as increasingly costly, risky, and violent.[42] The analyses for 1990–91, 1994–95, and 1998 are reported in Table III.[43]

To determine the relative causal impact of the independent tables, I created one table and four figures. Table IV uses tools developed by Scott Long to indicate the marginal impact of the independent variables in negative binomial regressions.[44] Further below, I include figures depicting the impact of dominant kin, nearby separatism, violence, and regime type upon the intensity of external assistance.

To determine the robustness of these results, I performed several additional tests. First, I re-ran the analyses using only the variables that were significant in the first set

[39] Even using data from the previous year does not really control completely for the endogeneity problem, but it is a start. A time-series analysis would be the best way to deal with this, but there are simply not enough time points.

[40] The observations are not technically independent as several countries contain more than a few groups, and some of the variables are coded by host state (regime type, relative power) than by group.

[41] For an argument about how scholars should analyze event counts, see King (1989). For an excellent discussion of analyzing event counts and a recent application to a related topic, see Bercovitch & Schneider (2000).

[42] I chose ordered logit, rather than ordered probit, as Scott Long has made some software available that allows for improved interpretation of ordered logit. See Long (1997) and his website: http://www.indiana.edu/~jsl650/. The ordered probit results are similar.

[43] I chose these three periods for the sake of brevity, as the results were largely consistent across the entire decade. Why these three years? By picking the first, the middle, and the last possible periods, I hope to show that the results are consistent. Because the dependent variables are highly correlated across the 1990s (breadth in 1990–91 is highly correlated with breadth in 1992–93, 1994–95, 1996, 1997, 1998, and intensity in the first period is highly correlated with intensity in subsequent periods), and because most of the independent variables do not change throughout the decade (except for power, regime type, and rebellion), we should not expect the results to vary much.

[44] Figures 1–4 were also developed using tools developed by Scott Long. See note 42.

Table III. Analyses of International Support for Minorities at Risk

		1990–91		*1994–95*		*1998*	
Argument	*Variables*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*
Ethnic politics	Racial differences	.11	.12	.11*	.36**	.003	–.05
	Linguistic differences	–.17	–.25	.02	–.56	.15	–.001
	Religious differences	.03	–.08	.03	.06	.06	–.05
	Does ethnic kin dominate adjoining state?	.37	.84*	.50**	1.13**	.53**	.84**
Vulnerability	African states	–.16	–.11	–.02	–.49	–.45	–.98*
	Is group separatist?	.65**	.38	.32*	.22	.03	–.13
	Other separatist groups in host state	–.12**	–.13	–.02	–.09	.03	–.03
	Separatists in nearby states	.08**	.12**	.04	.10**	.02	.11**
Realism	Relative power of host state	–.03	–.01	.03	–.03	.01	–.07
Control variables	Regime type	–.04**	–.05	–.03**	–.04*	–.04**	–.07**
	Rebellion	.07	.29**	.11**	.56**	.17**	.59**
	Constant/cut1	–.95	.92	1.03**	.91	–.86**	.58
	Alpha/cut2	.06	2.11	.000001	2.64	.06	1.83
	Cut 3		2.79		3.68		2.49
	Cut 4		3.38		4.69		4.05
	N	186	186	201	201	227	227
	Wald chi^2	76.27	52.90	80.00	62.67	79.47	84.50
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
	Log likelihood	–196.22	–211.16	–215.09	–217.90	–244.12	–235.59
	Pseudo R^2		.1018		.1775		.1815

Notes: B = breadth; I = intensity.
Breadth results are produced by negative binomial regression; intensity values are produced by ordered logit.
* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$
Boldface indicates significant results.

Table IV. Marginal Impact of Independent Variables upon Breadth of Support (No. of Countries Giving Assistance)

	Marginal Impact		
Variable	*1990*	*1994*	*1998*
Racial differences	.451	.113	.003
Linguistic differences	–.675	.023	.152
Religious differences	.114	.030	.060
Does ethnic kin dominate adjoining state?	1.435	.500	.531
African states	–.621	–.023	–.451
Is group separatist?	2.518	.317	.032
Other separatist groups in host	–.466	–.023	.025
Separatists in nearby states	.297	.036	.019
Relative power of host state	–.111	.028	.009
Regime type of host	–.159	–.026	–.038
Rebellion, previous year	.274	.112	.165

Note: Boldface indicates significant results.

to determine whether the initial results were caused by correlations among significant and insignificant variables. Very little changed in these analyses, so I do not present them below. Second, I re-ran the analyses in Table III excluding Eastern Europe or the former Soviet cases to see if the newly independent states and the conflicts within them biased the results. I found that no consistent pattern of new results emerged from this, although power gained significance in the 1990–91 analysis of breadth of support, and that separatism lost significance in 1994. Given that Russia has 11 different ethnic groups in the dataset and is one of the more powerful countries in the world, it is not surprising that dropping these cases influences the significance of relative power.[45]

Findings and Implications

The first important finding is that there are relatively few differences between the various models. Only racial differences, group separatism, other separatists in the same state are significant in one or two analyses and not the others. Otherwise, most variables have coefficients of similar direction and significance regardless of whether the dependent variable is the number of supporters or the highest level of support and regardless of which period analyzed. This should not be a surprise, since breadth and intensity are highly correlated with their values in other years. In sum, the results seem robust regardless of which dependent variable is used and which year is analyzed.

Ethnic Ties

The quantitative analyses suggest that ethnic ties matter, but that ethnic identities may not provide clear implications. The existence of ethnic kin dominating a nearby state consistently influenced the likelihood of groups receiving broad support, and groups in this situation were likely to receive the most intense forms of assistance. This supports the idea that ethnic ties matter, as those states with the interest (ethnic kin are dominant) and the opportunity (are nearby) are likely to give assistance. Groups without such allies

[45] Additionally, as discussed in note 30, dropping regime type and language differentials produced similar results.



Figure 1. Impact of Dominant Kin on Support Intensity, 1998

are less likely to get foreign support of any kind. As Table IV indicates, dominant kin influence the number of supporters (primarily from zero to one) more than any other factor except separatism in 1990. As Figure 1 illustrates,[46] the existence of dominant kin nearby increases the likelihood of more intense forms of support.

An additional test of this logic is to consider the opposite case – where kin are powerless. I performed additional analyses, not reported in the tables, substituting a new variable indicating whether a group was Roma or not for the indicator of dominant kin. Since the Roma wield little power in every state in which they reside, we should not be surprised that Roma receive little support. Other analyses focusing on the mere existence of segments of the group in other states produce no significant results – kin must not merely exist, but be politically influential in order to shape policy.[47]

The hypotheses regarding the nature of the ethnic cleavage defining the group found less support. Only in 1994–95 did groups defined by race gain more intense support than other groups. Otherwise, the indicators for racial, religious, and linguistic differentials produced small and insignificant coefficients. What does this suggest? Ethnic groups may be able to define themselves in ways that do not neatly correlate with their specific differences with the host state, so that outside support may not co-vary with the depth of real ethnic differences but with the strategically defined identities espoused by the group (Saideman & Dougherty, 2000). Otherwise, this finding suggests that some

[46] Figures 1–4 illustrate the likelihood of each level of support, compared to no support at all, as one varies a particular independent variable. For the sake of brevity, I only present figures for 1998, as this year had the largest number of observations, and as the most recent set of analyses is probably more relevant for the future.

[47] These results suggest that collective action problems and difficulties of lobbying probably matter as the mere existence of kin abroad is not significant, but these dynamics are less likely to matter where an ethnic group is dominant or in the majority.



Figure 2. Impact of Nearby Separatism on Support Intensity, 1998

language groups may be broader than is usually supposed, and the opposite is probably true for religious and racial identities as well, so that, in balance, one category of identity may not attract more or less support.

In sum, the analyses suggest that ethnic ties influence the international relations of ethnic conflicts, but that particular kinds of identities may not decisively shape the international relations of ethnic conflict.

Vulnerability

The analyses more clearly challenge the vulnerability argument. The only consistently significant findings here, whether a group's host borders separatist conflicts elsewhere, had coefficients in the opposite direction than expected in the analyses of support intensity.[48] That is, groups in dangerous neighborhoods are more likely to receive intense support. Rather than engaging in mutual restraint, states in high-risk regions may engage in conflict, supporting each other's separatists.[49]

Figure 2 indicates that moving from a neighborhood characterized by little separatism to one with the maximum number of actively separatist movements increases the probability of the strongest forms of support by approximately 45%. More work is required to understand this finding.

Other separatism in the same state was in the expected direction, but fell short of significance, except in 1990–91. African states were less likely to receive broad or intense support in 1998, but that raises the puzzle of why not in other years. Either norms and the OAU do not constrain the behavior of states as much as argued, or norms rebounded much more quickly from the precedents set

[48] This is not simply a product of these nearby separatists being kin, since analysis including a variable for the existence of separatist kin does not change the size, direction or significance of being near states facing separatist conflicts.

[49] As discussed above, Herbst's logic (1989) rests on Keohane's notion of reciprocity (1986), but reciprocity can lead to either cooperation or conflict. The findings here suggest that reciprocity can take a nasty form.

in the early 1990s than usually argued. Further, this result was less robust, as it lost significance in alternatively specified models.

The study produced unexpected results regarding separatist groups. The coefficients were consistently in the opposite direction from the vulnerability argument and significantly so in 1990–91 and 1994–95. The analyses did not produce the expected strongly negative correlations between a group's separatism and how much help it receives. Instead, as Table IV indicates, group separatism had the largest marginal impact in 1990–91 and the second largest in 1994–95. This directly challenges the vulnerability argument.

Events in the 1990s belie the assertions of vulnerability theorists. The analyses produce results opposite to what the vulnerability logic predicts. The conventional wisdom seems not to apply today.[50]

Realism

The analyses produced inconsistent and small correlations between relative power and the dependent variables. The hypothesis predicted a positive relationship, but this study indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that relative power does not matter. It may be the case that the mixture of security-seeking and greedy states produced the mixed results in the international system (Schweller, 1996). Perhaps the efforts of these states cancel each other out in the analyses. A dyadic analysis might also provide a better grasp, as these analyses take into account the power of a group's host relative to the world, rather than relative to any particular supporters.

Control Variables[51]

Both control variables are significantly correlated with whether a group received greater support. Rebellion, because of its substantive impact, deserves greater attention, though I discuss both in the sections below.

Rebellion Rebellion has a particularly strong influence: both on breadth of support and the intensity of assistance. The more violent a conflict is between an ethnic group and its host state, the more likely the group will receive wide and intense support. Given that this seems to run counter to the conventional wisdom,[52] this finding deserves more exploration. First, Table IV indicates that although the level of violence does have a substantial impact on the number of states giving assistance, this factor has a smaller impact than several other variables. However, as Figure 3 illustrates, the probability of a group receiving strong or intense support dramatically increases as the conflict becomes more violent.

Second, I completed another set of analyses, dividing the dataset into violent and nonviolent disputes. Peaceful conflicts, by far the majority in each period, were those scored as having no conflict, and violent ones were those with a rebellion score of one or greater. The purpose behind these analyses is

[50] These findings raise the question of whether the argument ever applied. The available data cannot get at this, although case studies (Saideman, 1997, 2001a) suggest that the conventional wisdom got the past wrong, too.

[51] One reviewer suggested that the criteria for inclusion in the dataset may be related to the international relations of ethnic conflict – that groups facing current discrimination may get more support than those that are disadvantaged from past discrimination, advantaged minorities facing challenges, or groups that support political organizations seeking group rights (the four at-risk variables) – and that we ought to control for different types of groups. In results not reported above, only one of the four, groups disadvantaged to a history of discrimination, produced consistently significant results, and this result only held up in three of the six tests (breadth and intensity in 1990–91, breadth in 1994–95). The original findings largely hold up even when these variables are included.

[52] Again, Regan (1998) asserts that states are less likely to intervene in violent conflicts since such efforts are less likely to produce a successful outcome – peace.



Figure 3. Impact of Previous Violence on Support Intensity, 1998

to determine whether the existence of violence interacts with other variables.[53]

What we find in Table V is that some variables seem to matter much more so in peaceful disputes, while others seem to affect the international relations of violent ethnic conflict. Nearby separatism seems to impact peaceful conflicts much more consistently than violent ones, as does regime type. What does this suggest? First, the fact that peaceful groups get more support in regions characterized by secessionism runs counter to the notion of dangerous neighborhoods and violent spillover effects. Perhaps states are more willing to support peaceful groups in dangerous neighborhoods precisely because this is less risky. Peaceful groups in democracies are less likely to receive support, whereas regime type matters less for groups involved in violence. This makes sense, as groups working through the system are both less likely to need external assistance and seen as less deserving, as democracy would seem to be functioning.

On the other hand, group separatism and relative power of the host state are significant only in violent conflicts. The former finding is logical, as violence and active separatism are associated with one another. The latter finding is suggestive. Violent groups in stronger states receive broader external assistance. Why would this be the case? In such situations, stronger states are more vulnerable, as they must dedicate significant resources to fighting their domestic opposition. This allows states to intervene with a lower probability of facing retribution.

Ultimately, the role of violence is difficult to assess, as international support may spur a group to engage in violence, or a group in the midst of protracted civil war may gain more international attention than other groups. In future work, including case studies, this ought to be explored further.

[53] I chose this method, rather than using interaction terms, as I had no *a priori* reasoning to determine which variables should interact with violence.

Table V. Analyses of Peaceful and Violent Disputes

		1990–91				*1994–95*				*1998*			
		Peaceful		*Violent*		*Peaceful*		*Violent*		*Peaceful*		*Violent*	
Argument	*Variables*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*	*B*	*I*
Ethnic politics	Racial differences	.08	.03	.17	.32	.12	.27	.16	.61**	–.05	–.11	.01	–.03
	Linguistic differences	.05	.71	–.27	–1.14*	.22	.07	–.01	–2.05**	.42	.23	.21	.42
	Religious differences	–.08	–.05	.06	–.15	–.01	.23*	.13	–.42	.02	.02	.08	–.22
	Does ethnic kin dominate adjoining state?	.16	.39	.40	1.00	.62**	1.15**	.32	1.71**	.52**	.70*	.53	1.25
Vulner.ability	African states	–.42	–.88	–.09	.41	–.50	–1.15*	.45	1.19	–.33	–.75	–.62	–.08
	Is group separatist?	.50	.35	.64**	.80	.04	.10	.88**	1.32*	–.06	.21	–.04	–.31
	Other separatist groups in host state	–.03	–.14	–.10	–.09	–.02	–.20*	–.02	–.06	–.03	–.18*	–.04	–.04
	Separatists in nearby states	.09**	.14**	.08	.19	.06**	.09**	.02	.28**	.05*	.14**	–.01	.10
Realism	Relative power of host state	–.05	–.07	–.13	–.01	.01	–.07	.06**	.01	–.02	–.08	.10**	.04
Control variables	Regime type	–.07**	–.10**	–.01	–.02	–.04**	–.07**	–.03**	–.03	–.05**	–.07**	–.03	–.02
	Constant/cut1	–.94**	1.08	–.54	.15	–1.10**	.93	–1.15**	.09	–.93**	.71	.10	.02
	Alpha/cut2	.03	2.44	.00	1.17	.00	2.99	.00	1.20	.47	2.19	.00	.57
	Cut 3		3.58		1.51		4.09		2.34		3.00		.88
	Cut 4		4.23		2.11		6.13		3.21		5.04		1.97
	N	132	132	56	56	143	143	59	59	174	174	59	59
	Wald chi^2	57.2	39.71	30.26	13.12	55.47	40.06	42.20	26.85	28.55	51.56	46.73	17.66
	Prob > chi^2	.0000	.0000	.0008	.2171	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0027	.0015	.0000	.0000	.0610
	Log likelihood	–122.2	–129.0	–71.9	–75.4	–138.6	–132.4	–72.3	–75.1	–168.4	–161.8	–83.84	–83.0
	Pseudo R^2		.0975		.0856		.1217		.1874		.1021		.0517

Notes: B = breadth; I = intensity.
Breadth results are produced by negative binomial regressions, intensity values are produced by ordered logits.
* $p < .1$; ** $p < .05$



Figure 4. Impact of Regime Type on Support Intensity, 1998

Regime Type Groups in authoritarian regimes are more likely to receive broader and more intense support. This may corroborate arguments suggesting that the justness of the cause matters. Because ethnic groups in the most authoritarian regimes have fewer options for settling their problems besides secession, they may receive more support from the outside world. Table IV suggests that regime type influences breadth of support, but has a smaller impact than the other variables.

Figure 4 shows that regime type does matter, as less intense support is more likely the more democratic a host state is. However, compared to the patterns in the other figures, regime type has a much smaller impact. I also performed separate analyses focusing only on groups in autocratic states and groups in democracies, akin to the analyses in Table V, but found very few consistent differences. Owing to space limitations, I do not present these results here.

Ultimately, while ethnic ties matter, they seem to have less influence than the control variables. This leaves us with more questions, because it is not clear what it is about increased violence that causes groups to receive more intense assistance, or whether intense support causes more violence. Likewise, more work is required to determine why democracy dampens external assistance.

Conclusions

It is important to indicate what this study does and does not tell us about the international relations of ethnic conflict. The findings suggest that ethnic politics influence which groups receive support, but further work is required. Because the ethnic ties argument focuses on the relationship between the domestic politics in one country and the combatants in ethnic conflicts elsewhere, one future direction is dyadic research.[54] Moreover, ethnic ties work both ways – ties to the group or ties to the host state. This analysis largely omits the host state's identity because of the nature of the available data, but leaving out the host state's

[54] For a first effort at dyadic analyses of this issue, see Saideman (2001b).

ethnic background may cause us to underestimate the influence of ethnic politics.

Multiple identities exist in most ethnic conflicts, and which ones are salient depends on the efforts of the various actors to define the conflict. Given this dynamic and perceptual character of identity, it is not surprising that I found little relationship between ethnic identities and international support. Instead, this study raises questions about 'Clash of Civilization' arguments (Huntington, 1993) that assert a dominating influence of one kind of identity – religion – at the expense of others.

This study raises important questions about the conventional wisdom that vulnerability and international norms deter support for separatist movements. The analyses ran counter to vulnerability's expectations. Policymakers cannot be confident that separatist groups will not receive external assistance. The conclusion is not that boundary norms are irrelevant, but that scholars may have exaggerated their influence.

Realist concerns may or may not play an important role in the international relations of ethnic conflict. This study, by focusing purely and simplistically on relative power, is not a definitive test, particularly as some realists argue that the world is full of both security-seeking and greedy states.

The roles of violence and regime type deserve further exploration, as these significantly influenced the probability of groups getting broad and intense support. Either external support may increase a conflict's violence or groups in the worst conflicts get more assistance. Either way, there are important implications for theory and policy. However, to determine these consequences, we must know the direction of causality. Increased democratization should decrease the levels of support groups receive. This suggests some interesting tests for future research – do groups receive less support as their host states develop new political structures?

The data analysis, specifically the relatively low R^2, suggests that there is much variance left to explain. There are many other factors that may shape a group's attractiveness to the international community not taken into account here, including: whether groups actively seek support,[55] atrocities committed by either combatant; the existence of economic resources, such as oil; and the skill of the group's leadership; to name just a few. Ideology of the host state and its alliance status may matter as well. Further study can address these concerns.

This article indicates that states discriminate in their foreign policies, supporting some groups and not others. This is not surprising, but it is interesting that ethnic politics seems to cause states to discriminate, rather than threats to international norms of territorial integrity (separatist groups) or more conventionally defined threats. If ethnic politics influences why groups receive support, policymakers need to consider this, so they can react better to such conflicts and anticipate the likely outcomes. This may cause policymakers to focus their attention on those conflicts where ethnic ties produce enough support for a particular side to win. As we grapple with ethnic conflicts in the future, we should consider the ethnic politics at work to anticipate what states are likely to do, which groups are likely to get help, and which disputes are likely to become internationalized.

[55] MAR raw data contain information about the strategies of groups, including the solicitation of external support. This variable produces significant findings, and increases the R^2, but I have not included it here as Ted Gurr has informed me of this variable's questionable reliability.

Appendix: Groups Dataset (mostly Minorities At Risk data)

Indicators	N	*Min.*	*Max.*	*Mean*	*SD*
Breadth of support received, 1990–91	251	0	4	.72	.95
Breadth of support received, 1994–95	250	0	6	.78	1.02
Breadth of support received, 1998	263	0	6	.79	1.13
Intensity of support received, 1990–91	251	0	4	1.01	1.34
Intensity of support received, 1994–95	250	0	4	1.04	1.33
Intensity of support received, 1998	263	0	4	.91	1.28
Racial differences	274	0	3	1.08	1.14
Linguistic differentials	249	.05	1	.60	.39
Religious differentials	274	0	3	1.38	1.32
Group is dominant in adjoining state	267	0	1	.26	.44
Is host state in sub-Saharan Africa?	267	0	1	.24	.43
Is a group actively separatist?	267	0	1	.34	.47
How many other groups in same state are separatist?	267	0	7	1.18	1.83
How many groups in adjacent states are separatist?	266	0	21	4.06	4.19
Host state's relative power, 1990	234	.01	16.47	1.76	3.69
Host state's relative power, 1992	261	.01	16.28	1.48	3.15
Host state's regime type, 1990	226	–10	10	.50	7.37
Host state's regime type, 1994	244	–10	10	2.76	6.71
Host state's regime type, 1998	263	–10	10	2.66	6.44
Rebellion index for 1989	271	0	7	.96	1.97
Rebellion index for 1993	272	0	7	1.06	1.97
Rebellion index for 1997	268	0	7	.86	1.82

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